CMMC&DefenseComplianceinTulsa

We treat CMMC as an operational program, not a one-time project. For Level 1 we stand up the self-attestation evidence you'll need for annual senior-official affirmation. For Level 2 we run the gap assessment, close findings via sequenced remediation, and coordinate with a C3PAO partner when you're ready for the certification assessment.

We map 7012's 14 families to concrete controls in your environment, configure your cloud footprint for FedRAMP Moderate equivalency (typically GCC High or Azure Government), and operationalize the 72-hour reporting workflow including DIBNet credentials and media preservation.

Full-lifecycle implementation: control-by-control gap assessment, remediation roadmap with effort scoring, SSP and POA&M authoring, evidence collection, and periodic re-baselining as contracts and Rev 3 adoption evolve.

We design access controls that enforce U.S.-person-only handling of ITAR/EAR-controlled technical data — identity-based segmentation, geofencing, managed-service-provider staffing attestations, and documented deemed-export safeguards for your offshoring decisions.

If your pipeline includes contracts trending toward Level 3, we scope the expected 800-53 enhancements, identify which 800-171 controls need deepening, and sequence a multi-year uplift so you're not surprised when a Level 3 flow-down appears.

We integrate HR systems with the identity-lifecycle controls NIST 800-171 requires — timely deprovisioning, separation of duties for privileged accounts, and audit-ready evidence that terminated staff lost CUI access on the right side of the termination date. For cleared-facility operators, we coordinate those controls with DCSA-oriented procedures the FSO maintains.

Our incident response playbook handles both notification tracks in parallel. DoD reporting through DIBNet doesn't satisfy Oklahoma notification (or vice versa), and missing either window creates legal exposure. We pre-stage the decision tree so your team isn't drafting notification logic at 2 AM during an active incident.

We reconcile state-contract security clauses with DFARS requirements so a single control program serves both. Overbuilding to DFARS when only state rules apply wastes money; underbuilding because state rules are less stringent loses contracts. We find the intersection.